ossrules.md

web-pentest

Authorized web pentest: recon, proof-based exploits, report.

  • Security
  • Pentest
  • Web
  • Recon

Declared platforms: linux · macos

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npx skills add 'https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/tree/main/optional-skills/security/web-pentest'
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main · 24fd22b ↗Scanned 2026-09-15

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---name: web-pentestdescription: "Authorized web pentest: recon, proof-based exploits, report."version: 1.0.0author: Teknium (teknium1), Hermes Agentlicense: MITplatforms: [linux, macos]category: securitytriggers:  - "pentest [URL]"  - "pentest this app"  - "penetration test [URL]"  - "security test this web app"  - "test [URL] for vulnerabilities"  - "find vulns in [URL]"  - "OWASP test [URL]"toolsets:  - terminal  - web  - browser  - file  - delegationmetadata:  hermes:    tags: [Security, Pentest, Web, Recon]    related_skills: []--- # Web Application Penetration Testing A phased pentesting workflow for running web applications. Adapted fromShannon's pipeline (Keygraph, AGPL — concepts only, no code borrowed).Built around three rules: 1. No exploit, no report — every finding requires reproducible evidence.2. Bounded scope — every active request goes against a target the operator   pre-declared. Off-scope hosts are refused.3. Bypass exhaustion before false-positive dismissal — a "blocked" payload   is not a clean bill of health until you've tried the bypass set. --- ## ⚠️ Hard Guardrails — Read Before Every Engagement Violating any of these invalidates the engagement and may be illegal. 1. **Authorization gate.** Before the first active scan in a session, you   MUST confirm with the user, in writing, that they own or have written   authorization to test the target. Record the acknowledgement in   `engagement/authorization.md` (see template). No acknowledgement → no   active scanning. Reading public pages with `curl` is fine; sending   payloads is not. 2. **Scope allowlist.** Maintain `engagement/scope.txt` — one hostname or   CIDR per line. Every `nmap`, `curl`, `whatweb`, browser navigation, or   payload-bearing request MUST be against an entry in scope. If a target   redirects you off-scope (3xx to a different host, a link in HTML),   STOP and confirm with the user before following. 3. **No production systems without paper.** If the user hasn't told you   "yes, prod is in scope and I have written sign-off," assume not. Default   targets are staging, local docker, dedicated test instances. 4. **Cloud metadata is off by default.** Do not probe `169.254.169.254`,   `metadata.google.internal`, `100.100.100.200`, `[fd00:ec2::254]`, or   equivalent unless the engagement explicitly includes SSRF-to-metadata   as a goal AND the target is one you control. The agent's browser tool   can reach these from inside your own infrastructure — don't. 5. **Destructive payloads need approval.** SQLi payloads that DROP/DELETE,   filesystem-write SSTI, command injection with `rm`/`shutdown`/`mkfs`,   anything that mutates beyond a single test row → ASK FIRST. The   `approval.py` system catches some; don't rely on it alone. 6. **Aux-client leakage risk (Hermes-specific).** This skill produces   sessions full of SQLi/XSS/RCE payloads, captured credentials, JWT   tokens. Hermes' compression and title-generation paths replay history   through the auxiliary client (often the main model). Anything sensitive   you write to the conversation can leave the box on the next compress.   Mitigation:   - Redact captured tokens/credentials to the LAST 6 CHARS before logging     them in any message. Full values go to `engagement/evidence/` files,     never into chat history.   - If the engagement is sensitive, set `auxiliary.title_generation.enabled: false`     in `~/.hermes/config.yaml` for the session. 7. **Rate limit yourself.** Default 200ms between active requests against   any single host. The recon-scan.sh script enforces this. Don't bypass   it without operator approval. 8. **Authority of the report.** This skill produces a security   assessment, not a "PASS." Even a clean run is "no exploitable issues   FOUND in scope X within time T using methods Y" — not "the application   is secure." Mirror that language in the report. --- ## Phase 0: Engagement Setup Before any scanning happens, create the engagement directory andauthorization acknowledgement. ```bashENGAGEMENT=engagement-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)mkdir -p "$ENGAGEMENT"/{evidence,findings,reports}cd "$ENGAGEMENT"``` 1. **Ask the user (verbatim):**   > "Confirm: (a) the target URL is [X], (b) you own this application   > or have written authorization to test it, and (c) the engagement   > may run for up to [N] hours starting now. Reply 'authorized' to   > proceed." 2. **Wait for explicit `authorized` response.** Any other answer means STOP. 3. **Record authorization** to `engagement/authorization.md` using the   template in `templates/authorization.md`. Include:   - Target URL(s) and IP(s)   - Authorization basis (ownership / written authz from $name)   - Engagement window   - Out-of-scope items (production, third-party services, etc.)   - Operator name (the user driving this session) 4. **Build scope.txt:**   ```   localhost   127.0.0.1   staging.example.com   192.168.1.0/24    # internal lab only, with operator OK   ``` 5. **Read** `references/scope-enforcement.md` before issuing the first   active request — that doc has the host-extraction rules you apply   to every command/URL before it goes out. --- ## Phase 1: Pre-Recon (Code Analysis, optional) Skip if no source access (black-box engagement). If you have read access to the application source: 1. **Map the architecture** — framework, routing, middleware stack2. **Inventory sinks** — every `execute(`, `os.system(`, `eval(`,   template render, file read/write, redirect target3. **Map auth** — session cookie vs JWT, OAuth flows, password reset,   privileged endpoints4. **Identify trust boundaries** — what's authenticated, what's not,   what comes from `request.*`5. **Backward taint** from each sink to a request source. Early-terminate   when proper sanitization is found (parameterized queries, allowlists,   `shlex.quote`, well-known escapers). Output: `evidence/pre-recon.md` — architecture map, sink inventory,suspected vulnerable code paths. This is OFFLINE work. No traffic to the target. --- ## Phase 2: Recon (Live, Read-Only) Maps the attack surface. All requests are GETs of public pages, nopayloads yet. Still scope-bounded. 1. **Verify scope.** Resolve every target hostname → IP. Confirm IPs are   in scope (avoids the "DNS points somewhere unexpected" trap). 2. **Network surface** (only if scope permits port scanning):   ```bash   nmap -sT -T3 --top-ports 100 -oN evidence/nmap.txt $TARGET   ```   Use `-T3` (default), not `-T4/-T5`. Stealthier and avoids tripping   IDS/IPS in shared environments. 3. **Tech fingerprint:**   ```bash   whatweb -v $TARGET_URL > evidence/whatweb.txt   curl -sIk $TARGET_URL > evidence/headers.txt   ``` 4. **Endpoint discovery:**   - Crawl the app with the browser tool (`browser_navigate`,     `browser_get_images`, follow links).   - Inspect `robots.txt`, `sitemap.xml`, `.well-known/*`.   - Use the developer tools network panel via browser tool to capture     XHR/fetch calls. 5. **Auth surface:** Identify login, registration, password reset,   session cookie names, token formats. Do NOT send credentials yet —   just observe. 6. **Correlate with pre-recon** (if you have source). For each   `evidence/pre-recon.md` finding, mark whether the live surface   confirms it's reachable. Output: `evidence/recon.md` — endpoints, technologies, auth model,input vectors. --- ## Phase 3: Vulnerability Analysis One delegate_task per vulnerability class. Each agent reads`evidence/recon.md` (+ `evidence/pre-recon.md` if present), produces`findings/<class>-queue.json` using `templates/exploitation-queue.json`. Use `delegate_task` with these focused subagents (parallel where possible): | Class | Goal | Reference ||-------|------|-----------|| `injection` | SQLi, command, path traversal, SSTI, LFI/RFI, deserialization | `references/vuln-taxonomy.md` (slot types) || `xss` | Reflected, stored, DOM-based | `references/vuln-taxonomy.md` (render contexts) || `auth` | Login bypass, JWT confusion, session fixation, OAuth flaws | `references/exploitation-techniques.md` || `authz` | IDOR, vertical/horizontal escalation, business logic | `references/exploitation-techniques.md` || `ssrf` | Internal reachability, metadata, protocol smuggling | Skip metadata unless explicitly authorized || `infra` | Misconfig, info disclosure, default creds, exposed admin | `references/exploitation-techniques.md` | Each queue entry has: id, vuln class, source (file:line if known),endpoint, parameter, slot type, suspected defense, verdict(`identified` / `partial` / `confirmed` / `critical`), witness payload,confidence (0-1), notes. The analysis phase doesn't send malicious payloads yet — it stages them.The exploitation phase actually fires them. --- ## Phase 4: Exploitation (Proof-Based, Conditional) Only run a sub-agent per class where the analysis queue has actionableentries (`identified` or `partial`). For each candidate: 1. **Pre-send check** — host in scope? auth gate satisfied? payload   approved if destructive?2. **Send the witness payload** — minimal proof. SQLi: `' AND 1=1--`   then `' AND 1=2--`. XSS: a benign marker like   `<svg/onload=console.log("HERMES-PENTEST-XSS")>`. Never `alert(1)` in   stored XSS — it'll fire for other users in shared environments.3. **Verify the witness fires** — for blind injection, use a sleep   probe (`SLEEP(5)`) and time the response. For SSRF, use a   tester-controlled callback host you own (NOT a public service like   webhook.site for sensitive engagements — exfil paths).4. **Promote level:**   - **L1 Identified** — pattern matched, no behavior change   - **L2 Partial** — sink reached, but defense in place   - **L3 Confirmed** — payload changed app behavior in observable way   - **L4 Critical** — data extracted, code executed, access escalated5. **Bypass exhaustion before classifying as FP.** For each candidate   that blocks: try at least the bypass set in   `references/bypass-techniques.md` for that class. Only after the set   is exhausted may you write `verdict: false_positive`.6. **Record evidence** for every L3/L4:   - Full request (method, URL, headers, body)   - Response (status, headers, relevant body excerpt)   - Reproducer command (curl one-liner)   - Impact statement Output: `findings/exploitation-evidence.md` **Redact in evidence files:**- Any captured credentials/tokens → last 6 chars only in chat;  full value to `findings/secrets-vault.md` (gitignored).- Other users' PII → redact.- Your test credentials → fine to keep. --- ## Phase 5: Reporting Generate the final report using `templates/pentest-report.md`. Sections: 1. Executive summary2. Engagement scope (from `engagement/scope.txt`)3. Authorization (from `engagement/authorization.md`)4. Findings (L3/L4 only — proof-required). Per finding:   - Title, severity (CVSS 3.1), CWE   - Affected endpoint(s)   - Proof (request + response excerpt)   - Reproduction steps   - Impact   - Remediation5. Not-exploited candidates (L1/L2 with notes on what blocked them)6. Out-of-scope observations7. Methodology / tools used8. Limitations and what was NOT tested **Severity policy:** CVSS only for L3/L4. L1/L2 are "candidates pendingverification" — don't assign CVSS to unverified findings. --- ## When to Stop - The user revokes authorization.- A candidate finding clearly impacts production data and you don't have  approval for destructive testing — STOP and ask.- The target starts returning 503/429 storms — back off, reconvene with  the operator.- You discover something *outside* the contracted scope (e.g. an exposed  customer database while testing an unrelated endpoint). STOP, document,  report to the operator. Do not pivot without explicit approval — that  pivot is what makes pentesting illegal. --- ## What This Skill Does NOT Cover - Network-layer pentesting beyond port scanning (no Metasploit,  Cobalt Strike, AD attacks, network protocol fuzzing).- Reverse engineering / binary analysis (see issue #383).- Source-only static analysis (see issue #382).- Active social engineering / phishing.- Anything against systems the operator hasn't pre-authorized. If the engagement needs any of these, escalate to a professionalpentester. This skill complements professional pentesting; it doesnot replace it. --- ## Further Reading - `references/scope-enforcement.md` — how to bound every active request- `references/vuln-taxonomy.md` — slot types, render contexts, OWASP map- `references/exploitation-techniques.md` — per-class payload patterns- `references/bypass-techniques.md` — common WAF/filter bypasses- `templates/authorization.md` — engagement authorization template- `templates/pentest-report.md` — final report template- `templates/exploitation-queue.json` — per-class finding queue schema- `scripts/recon-scan.sh` — rate-limited nmap+whatweb+headers wrapper
Discovery context

Discovered by repository scan. No exact path reference found in the snapshot’s root AGENTS.md.

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